Excerpts of the Prime Minister's statement - this is a preliminary
transcript that is yet to be corrected and matched with the
official transcription from the Lok Sabha.
I rise to inform
this august House that the Government of India has reached
agreement with the Government of the United States of America on
the text of the bilateral Agreement on Cooperation for Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy.
2. This Government
has kept Parliament fully in the picture at various stages of
our negotiations with the United States. We have never shied
away from a full discussion in Parliament on this important
issue. I have myself made statements on several previous
occasions – on July 29, 2005 soon after my return from
Washington; on February 27, 2006 during which I took Parliament
into confidence regarding our ongoing discussions with the
United States on the Separation Plan; and on March 7, 2006
following the visit of President Bush to India. I also made a
detailed statement in the Rajya Sabha on August 17, 2006
conveying certain solemn commitments to which I shall return
shortly.
Our Government has
adhered scrupulously to Parliamentary traditions and practices.
We have in fact gone far beyond any previous Government.
3. After the
conclusion of the Agreement we have also briefed many of the
parties represented in Parliament on the details of the
Agreement.
4. The Agreement is
about civil nuclear energy cooperation. It is an Agreement
between two States possessing advanced nuclear technologies,
both parties having the same benefits and advantages. The
significance of the Agreement lies in the fact that when brought
into effect, it will open the way for full civil nuclear energy
cooperation between India and the United States. We have
negotiated this Agreement as an equal partner, precisely because
of the achievements of our scientists and technologists in
overcoming the barriers placed around us in the past. This is an
Agreement based on the principle of mutual benefit.
5. There has been
considerable public debate and discussion on various aspects of
the Agreement. On August 17, 2006, I had given a solemn
commitment to Parliament and to the country regarding what we
can agree and cannot agree with the United States to enable
civil nuclear energy cooperation with India. I had stressed that
it must be within specific parameters, which I had shared with
Parliament. This was an unprecedented measure of transparency on
our part even in the midst of complex negotiations.
6. I had given
Parliament my assurance that the Government will make every
effort so that the vision of the Joint Statements of July, 2005
and March, 2006 becomes a living reality. I believe that we have
redeemed that pledge. In concluding this Agreement, we have
ensured that the autonomy of our strategic programme is fully
maintained, and that Dr. Homi Bhabha’s long-term vision remains
our guiding principle.
7. With your
permission, I wish to draw the attention of this august House to
the main features of the Agreement in some detail. It would
become evident that the commitments I had made to Parliament,
including those on August 17, 2006, have been fully adhered to.
(i) Full Civil
Nuclear Cooperation
Ø The concept of
full civil nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in
this Agreement. The Agreement stipulates that uch cooperation
will include nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated
nuclear fuel cycle, including technology transfer on industrial
or commercial scale. It would also include development of a
strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any
disruption of supply over the lifetime of our reactors.
Ø A significant
aspect of the Agreement is our right to reprocess US origin
spent fuel. This has been secured upfront. We view our right to
reprocess as a key element of a closed fuel cycle, which will
enable us to make full use in our national facilities of the
energy potential of the nuclear fuel used in our reactors. This
important yardstick has been met by the permanent consent for
India to reprocess.
Ø India will
establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to
reprocessing foreign nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.
India and the US will mutually agree on arrangements and
procedures under which such reprocessing will take place in the
new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will
begin within six months of a request by either party and will be
concluded within one year. There is no ambiguity with regard to
the commitments of both countries.
Ø Any special
fissionable material that may be separated may be utilized in
national facilities under IAEA safeguards. Thus the interests of
our three stage nuclear programme have been protected.
Ø The United States
has a longstanding policy of not supplying to any country
enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities.
This Agreement provides for such transfers to India only through
an amendment. Forward- looking language has been included for
dual use transfers of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water
production facilities. We hope transfers will become possible as
cooperation develops and expands in the future. It is important
to note that no prohibition that is specifically directed
against India has been included in the Agreement.
(ii) The Principle
of Reciprocity:
Ø The principle of
reciprocity, which was integral to the July 2005 Statement, has
been fully safeguarded in this Agreement. There is no change in
our position that we would accept only IAEA safeguards on our
civilian nuclear facilities. This would also be in a phased
manner and as identified for that purpose in the Separation
Plan, and only when all international restrictions on nuclear
trade with India have been lifted. India will not take any
irreversible steps with the IAEA prior to this.
(iii) Certification:
Ø This Agreement
emphasizes the desire of both countries to cooperate extensively
in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of
achieving energy security on a stable, reliable and predictable
basis. This Agreement further confirms that US cooperation with
India is a permanent one.
There is no
provision that states that US cooperation with India will be
subject to an annual certification process.
Ø Hon’ble Members
may recall that the 18th July 2005 Joint Statement had
acknowledged that India be regarded as a state with advanced
nuclear technology enjoying the same advantages and benefits as
other States with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US.
This Agreement makes specific references to India and the United
States as States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both
parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed
to preventing WMD proliferation.
(iv) Safeguards:
Ø As agreed in the
March Separation Plan, India has accepted only IAEA safeguards
that will be reflected in an India-specific Safeguards Agreement
with the IAEA.
We have not
consented to any provision that mandates scrutiny of our nuclear
weapons programme or any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. There
are explicit provisions in the Agreement that make it clear that
this Agreement does not affect our unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities and that it will not affect our right to use
materials, equipment, information or technology acquired or
developed independently. India and the United States have agreed
that the implementation of the Agreement will not hinder or
otherwise interfere with India’s nuclear activities including
our military nuclear facilities. Nothing in the Agreement would
impinge on our strategic programme, our three-stage nuclear
power programme or our ability to conduct advanced R&D.
(v) Fuel Supply
Assurances:
Ø I would like to
reiterate that the March 2006 Separation Plan provided for an
India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, with
assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that
would be placed under IAEA safeguards together with India’s
right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are
interrupted. An important assurance given is the commitment of
support for India’s right to build up strategic reserves of
nuclear fuel to meet the lifetime requirements of India’s
reactors.
Ø This Agreement
envisages, in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support
for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear
fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime
of India’s reactors. The Agreement reiterates in toto the
corresponding portions of the Separation Plan.
It has endorsed the
right of India to take corrective measures to ensure
uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the
event of disruption of foreign fuel supply.
Hon’ble Members will
agree that these provisions will ensure that there is no repeat
of our unfortunate experience with Tarapur.
(vi) Integrity and
reliability of our strategic programme, autonomy of decision
making and future scientific research and development:
Ø In my statements
of March 7 and August 17, 2006, I had assured Parliament that
the Separation Plan would not adversely affect our strategic
programme, the integrity of the three-stage nuclear programme
and the autonomy of our Research and Development activity.
Ø This Agreement
does not in any way impact on India’s ability to produce and
utilize fissile material for its current and future strategic
needs.
Our right to use for
our own purposes our independent and indigenously developed
nuclear facilities has been fully preserved. The Agreement also
provides for non-hindrance and non-interference in our
activities involving use of nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment, components, information or technology and
military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed
independently for our own purposes.
(vii) Cessation of
cooperation:
Ø An elaborate
multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard
to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either
Party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the
Agreement. Both Parties have agreed to take a number of factors
into account in their consultations so that the scope for
precipitate or unilateral action is reduced.
Cessation of
cooperation can be sought by the US only if it is prepared to
take the extreme step of termination of the Agreement. India’s
right to take “corrective measures” will be maintained even
after the termination of the Agreement.
Ø In the case of
termination of this Agreement and cessation of cooperation by
either Party, each has the right to seek return of nuclear
material and equipment supplied by it to the other. However,
before the right of return is exercised, the Agreement commits
the parties to consult and to take into account specific factors
such as national security, ongoing contracts and projects,
compensation at market value, physical protection and
environmental issues. India and the United States have agreed to
consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to
termination, including a party’s concerns about a change in the
security environment or a response to similar actions by other
states that could impact on national security.
The Agreement
stipulates that the two parties recognise that exercising the
right of return would have profound implications and
consequences for their relations.
Ø From India’s point
of view our primary objective is to ensure the uninterrupted
operation of our nuclear reactors, in the context of the
detailed fuel supply assurances provided in the Separation Plan
and these are now reflected in full in the Agreement. The
Agreement specifically states in regard to fuel supply
assurances and India’s right to take “corrective measures” that
there will be no derogation of India’s rights in this regard,
including the right to take “corrective measures” to ensure the
uninterrupted operation of its reactors. This reflects the
balance of obligations consistent with the understandings of the
July Statement and the March Separation Plan.
8. Among the
significant and innovative features of this Agreement are
specific mention of the right to run foreign supplied reactors
‘without interruption’ and to take ‘corrective measures’ in the
event of fuel supply disruption. This has been made possible by
crafting the provisions in a manner that provide for explicit
linkages and interlocking of rights and commitments contained in
the Agreement.
9. The Agreement
does not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future
nuclear tests, if it is necessary in India’s national interest.
Let me hence reiterate once again that a decision to undertake a
future nuclear test would be our sovereign decision, one that
rests solely with the Government. There is nothing in the
Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or
legally constrain its options to protect India’s security and
defence needs.
10. If I might
sum-up, this Agreement does not in any way inhibit, restrict or
curtail our strategic autonomy or capabilities. Our rights to
pursue our three-stage nuclear power programme remain undiluted.
In the unlikely
event of cessation of cooperation there is no derogation of our
rights with regard to corrective measures. Our reprocessing
rights are upfront and are permanent in nature. Advanced R&D
programmes and IPR Protection are fully safeguarded.
11. As I have said,
this is an Agreement for cooperation between India and the US on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Its genesis is the shared
perception between India and the US that both our countries need
to address their energy challenges, and address them in a manner
that is sensitive to concerns about the environment. For India,
it is critically important to maintain our current GDP growth
rate of 8 to 10% per annum if our goal of eradicating poverty is
to be achieved. The energy implications of this growth rate over
the next couple of decades are enormous. Even if we were to
exploit all our known resources of coal, oil, gas and
hydropower, we would still be confronted with a yawning demand
and supply gap.
12. India’s
three-stage nuclear power programme holds immense promise for
the future. The unique thorium-based technology would become an
economically viable alternative over a period of time following
sequential implementation of the three stages. We must, in the
meantime, explore and exploit every possible source of energy.
Nuclear energy is a logical choice for India. Indigenous
supplies of uranium are highly inadequate and hence we need to
source uranium supply from elsewhere. In a globalised world,
technology is always a premium item and we look forward to
expanding our horizons in this regard as well. We intend to
carry forward our cooperation with other countries in civil
nuclear energy, in particular with major nuclear suppliers such
as Russia and France.
13. We already have
a comprehensive nuclear infrastructure. We have a corps of
skilled and technically qualified manpower in this sector. It
makes sense for us to leverage this valuable asset. As Hon’ble
Members are aware, our target for the year 2020 is 20,000 MW of
nuclear power generation. It is quite modest.
However, if
international cooperation once again became available, we could
hope to double this target.
14. On the basis of
the Indo-US bilateral Agreement and the finalisation of an
India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which is
being taken up shortly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is expected
to adapt its guidelines to enable international commerce with
India in civil nuclear energy and all dual use technologies
associated with it. This would be the beginning of the end of
the technology-denial regimes against India that have been in
existence for over three decades.
15. Apart from its
direct impact on our nuclear energy programme, this Agreement
will have major spin-offs for the development of our industries,
both public and private. High technology trade with the US and
other technologically advanced countries will expand rapidly.
16. I wish to draw
attention to another major gain for India from this initiative.
We will be creating
opportunities for our scientists to participate in the
international exchange of scientific ideas and technical
know-how and to contribute to the global effort to deal with the
world-wide challenges of energy security and climate change.
This includes the International Thermonuclear Research Reactor
or ITER project, in which India has already joined as a full and
equal member along with a handful of technologically advanced
countries.
17. In discussions
on this subject, questions have been raised about Government’s
commitment to an independent foreign policy. I have clearly
spelt out the Government’s position in this regard in my
statements to Parliament in March and August 2006. I had
specially underlined that the pursuit of a foreign policy that
is independent in its judgement is a legacy of our founding
fathers and an abiding commitment of my Government. India is too
large and too important a country to have the independence of
its foreign policy taken away by any power.
Today, India stands
on the world stage as an influential and respected member of the
international community. There is independence in our thought
and independence in our actions.
18. I would like to
reiterate that our engagement today with all global powers like
US, Russia, China, EU, UK, France, Germany and Japan is
unprecedented. Engagement with West, East, South East and
Central Asia has been significantly stepped up with visible
results. We are building new frontiers in our ties with Africa
and Latin America. In South Asia we seek to develop a peaceful
environment, one that is conducive to ambitious developmental
targets. I urge those who question our commitment to an
independent foreign policy to display the same degree of
confidence in India, as others from outside do.
19. Thus, there is
no question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our
independent foreign policy. We shall retain our strategic
autonomy.
At the same time, we
must not forget India’s long-standing commitment to the noble
ideas of nuclear disarmament and our refusal to participate in
any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. Our commitment to
universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear
weapons remains undiminished. It was this vision of a world free
of nuclear weapons which Shri Rajiv Gandhi put before the UN in
1988 and this still has universal resonance.
20. We remain
committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing. We are also committed to negotiate a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty or FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. India
is willing to join only a non-discriminatory, multilaterally
negotiated, and internationally verifiable FMCT, as and when it
is concluded in the Conference on Disarmament, subject to it
meeting our national security interests.
21. Despite changes
in government and changes in political leadership we have always
tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of
global responsibility and with a commitment to the ideals of
general and complete disarmament, including global nuclear
disarmament. This Government believes that our commitment to
these ideals and our efforts to realize them must continue, and
continue with even greater vigour, now that we are a nuclear
weapon state. The possession of nuclear weapons only increases
our sense of responsibility and does not diminish it.
22. Pending global
nuclear disarmament, India has maintained an impeccable
non-proliferation record. As a responsible nuclear power, India
will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive
technologies. We stand for the strengthening of the
non-proliferation regime as the infirmities in this regime have
affected our security interests. We will work together with the
international community to advance our common objective of
non-proliferation.
23. There are now
other landmarks to cross before the goal of India joining the
international mainstream as a full and equal partner becomes a
reality. We have to finalise an India-specific Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA. Thereafter, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
has to agree, by consensus, to adapt its guidelines, we expect
without conditions, to enable nuclear commerce with India and to
dismantle the restrictions on the transfer of dual use
technologies and items to our country. The US Administration is
to secure requisite approval from the US Congress. The
completion of these next steps will mark the practical
realization of this initiative.
24. Our negotiators
deserve credit for delivering to the nation an Agreement, which
can potentially transform the economic prospects of our country.
It is an Agreement that will enable us to meet the twin
challenges of energy security and environmental sustainability,
and remove the technology denial regimes that have, for decades,
been a major constraint on our development.
At the same time, it
will bring India the recognition it deserves thanks to the
outstanding achievements of our scientists in nuclear and space
sciences as well as other high technology areas.
25. This historic
initiative has received the steadfast support of President Bush
and senior members of his Administration. The strengthening and
enhancement of our bilateral relations is an objective that has
received his unstinting personal support and commitment. This
Agreement is a shining example of how far we have progressed.
26. Finally, Sir,
let me end by saying that we have achieved an Agreement that is
good for India, and good for the world. I am neither given to
exaggeration nor am I known to be self-congratulatory. I will
let history judge; I will let posterity judge the value of what
we have done through this Agreement. In days to come it will be
seen that it is not just the United States but nations across
the world that wish to arrive at a new equilibrium in their
relations with India. This agreement with the United States will
open new doors in capitals across the world. It is another step
in our journey to regain our due place in global councils. When
future generations look back, they will come to acknowledge the
significance of this historic deal.
Thank you, Sir.
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